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Title: False Advertising: How the Third Circuit Misused The Free Speech Standard to the 
Benefit of New Jersey Lawyers and the Detriment of the Public 
Jason Dominguez 
Part I: Introduction 
 Though free speech is a pillar of American society, it is appropriate at times, to qualify or 
even restrict speech. This Note argues in favor of one such restriction on attorney advertising and 
critiques the Third Circuit’s reasons for striking down the restriction. In Dwyer v. Cappell,1 the 
Third Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of “Guideline 3,” a Rule of Professional Conduct.2 
Guideline 3, adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2012, stated that attorneys could not 
include subsections of a court opinion “about the attorney’s abilities or legal services” in any 
advertising. 3  Ultimately, the Court held that Guideline 3 violated the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech.4 In particular, it held that Guideline 3 failed to meet the low threshold 
established in Zauderer v. Officer of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 5 which 
pertains to “disclosure requirements” on commercial speech.6 Because of this, the Court failed to 
explore the heightened standard articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service 
Comm’n of N.Y.,7 which pertains to “restrictions” or bans on commercial speech.8  
 The Court held that Guideline 3 failed to meet the threshold for disclosure requirements 
because it practically banned commercial speech by demanding “unduly burdensome” 
requirements.9 To support that reasoning, the Third Circuit looked to cases where disclosure 
                                                        
1 Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2014). 
2 Id. at 284-85.  
3 Rules of Professional Conduct, Guideline 3 (effective June 1, 2012), 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/apprpc.htm. 
4 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276. 
5 Id. at 284. 
6 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
7 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
8 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-5; Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 284. 
9 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 284. 
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requirements were unduly burdensome and posited that Guideline 3 was equally burdensome.10 
This Note posits that the Third Circuit incorrectly held that Guideline 3 was unconstitutional. 
 Part II of this Note will provide background information regarding the origin and evolution 
of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct.11 It will also give the procedural history and 
facts of the case at issue.12 Part III begins by discussing relevant legal background surrounding 
the Third Circuit's holding and this Note's response, discussing the standards the Supreme Court 
established for analyzing issues involving free speech and commercial speech.13 Then, this Note 
explains how and why the Third Circuit incorrectly applied the legal standards.14 Part IV 
explores the impact of the Third Circuit's ruling on attorney advertising, free speech, and public 
trust in the legal system moving forward.15 Lastly, Part V concludes by reasserting this Note’s 
legal arguments and the effect of the Third Circuit’s ruling.16 
 This Note will not, however, discuss Guideline 3’s effect on other forms of advertising, 
such as billboard or television ads, nor whether Guideline would be able to meet the Central 
Hudson standard for commercial speech restrictions. It only suggests that if Dwyer were 
appealed to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit’s decision should be reversed; moreover, 
Guideline 3 should be viewed as an appropriate disclosure requirement in light of Zauderer, and 
perhaps a necessary form of speech restriction in the legal community. 
Part II: Background 
A. New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct 
                                                        
10 Id. at 283-84. 
11 See infra Part II A. 
12 See infra Part II B. 
13 See infra Part III A, B, and C. 
14 See infra Part III D, E, and F. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 See infra Part V. 
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 This Note deals with a Third Circuit case involving a specific provision within the New 
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). Though New Jersey only recently established its 
own rules governing attorneys, rules of this sort date back farther than one hundred years within 
the general legal community. 17  In 1908, the ABA effectuated the “Canons of Professional 
Ethics,” which New Jersey later adopted as its own professional regulation framework.18 In 
1971, New Jersey adopted the “Disciplinary Rules of the ABA’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility,” which the ABA created to replace the Canons of Professional Ethics.19 In fact, 
New Jersey did not establish its own independent code of professional conduct until 1984, as it 
had previously chosen to adopt whatever the ABA standard at the time.20 In 1984, however, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, guided by Chief Justice Wilentz, appointed the “Debevoise 
Committee” to study the ABA’s “Model Rules of Professional Conduct” and make any 
necessary revisions.21  
 The Supreme Court’s power to create the committee originated from the New Jersey 
Constitution itself.22 The New Jersey Constitution gives the New Jersey Supreme Court the right 
to “make rules governing the administration of all the courts in the State, and subject to the law, 
the practice and procedure in all such courts.”23 The Supreme Court has long understood this 
provision as a grant of authority to “exercise exclusive power over the disciplining of 
                                                        
17 2 New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NEW JERSEY 318 
(2000). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Redefining of Professional Ethics in New Jersey under Chief 
Justice Robert Wilentz: A Legacy of Reform, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 351, 362 (1997). 
21 Id. 
22 N.J. CONST. art VI, §2, ¶3.  
23 Id. 
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attorneys.”24  Part of this power encompasses the ability to establish a code of professional 
conduct that guides how attorneys in New Jersey are to carry out their professional endeavors.25 
 The Commission on the Rules of Professional Conduct has made sporadic amendments to 
the New Jersey RPC over the past thirty years. Two larger scale reforms came in 1995, via the 
“Michels Commission,”26 and in 2003, via the “Pollock Commission.”27 Even so, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct established by the Debevoise Committee remain largely intact today. 
B. Summary of Dwyer 
 One of these provisions, a rule restricting attorney advertising, was as the focus of the 
court’s attention in Dwyer v. Cappell.28 There, the Third Circuit heard an appeal regarding the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Cappell, who represented the New Jersey 
Committee on Attorney Advertising.29 Andrew Dwyer was a New Jersey attorney who displayed 
several quotes of unpublished judicial opinions, including apparent endorsements of his skills as 
an attorney and advocate, on a website advertising his legal services.30 These “endorsements” 
came in the context of cases concerning the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, which 
contains fee-shifting provisions mandating that the judges “assess the abilities and legal services 
of plaintiffs’ attorneys” in deciding the cases.31  
                                                        
24 In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 678 (1984). 
25 Id. (“[O]ur constitutional responsibility is so clear as to leave no doubt of our duty to adopt a rule that we think is 
needed...”). 
26 Report of the New Jersey Ethics Commission ("Michels Comm'n Report"), 133 N.J.L.J. 905 (March 15, 1993).  
27 Administrative Determinations in response to the Report and Recommendation of the Supreme Court Commission 
on the Rules of Professional Conduct, (September 10, 2003), 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/admin-deter-rpcs.pdf.  
28 Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2014). 
29 At the time of trial, Cynthia Cappell served as Chair of the Supreme Court of New Jersey Committee on Attorney 
Advertising. 
30 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276. 
31 N.J. STAT. § 10:5-27.1 (2002); Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276. 
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 In 2008, Judge Wertheimer, one of the judges Dwyer had quoted on his website, sent a 
letter to Dwyer asking him to remove the quote. 32  Knowing the true context in which the 
statements were made, Wertheimer feared that, though the quotes were technically accurate, 
Dwyer’s potential clients would believe Wertheimer had given Dwyer a “blanket 
endorsement.”33 When Dwyer refused, arguing that the quote was neither false nor misleading, 
Judge Wertheimer contacted the New Jersey Bar’s Committee on Attorney Advertising.34 
 The Committee eventually submitted a guideline, Guideline 3, that stated “an attorney or 
law firm may not include, on a website or other advertisement, a quotation from a judge or court 
opinion . . . regarding the attorney’s abilities or legal services.” 35  Dwyer maintained that 
Guideline 3 unconstitutionally restricted his free speech, going so far as to post an additional 
quote on his website, after the Committee’s decision.36 
 In 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved the Guideline 3. 37  At its core, 
Guideline 3 banned attorneys from using excerpts of court opinions in their advertisements, but 
allowed them to “present the full text of opinions, including those that discuss the attorney’s 
legal abilities.”38 Before Guideline 3 went into effect, however, Dwyer filed a motion to keep it 
from being enforced.39  
 During trial, Carol Johnston, an agent for the Committee on Attorney Advertising, 
testified that, “even if the quotations include hyperlinks to the full text of the judicial opinions, 
they would still violate the Guideline.”40 She also admitted that the Committee had no evidence 
                                                        
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 277. 
37 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 277. 
38 Guideline 3, supra note 3. 
39 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 278. 
40 Id. 
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of complaints from anyone other than Judge Wertheimer, but that they used “common sense” to 
conclude that clients could be misled by the excerpts.41 
 The Court decided the legal issue revolved around “whether Guideline 3 is most 
appropriately characterized as a ‘restriction’ on speech, or whether it instead is a regulatory 
requirement of ‘additional disclosure.’”42 If characterized as a restriction, Guideline 3 would 
have to satisfy much more stringent qualifications to be constitutional than if it were simply a 
disclosure requirement. Positing that the guideline only amounted to a disclosure requirement, 
however, the District Court upheld the Guideline as constitutional.43 Dwyer then appealed to the 
Third Circuit.44 
 The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Guideline 3 failed to meet the Supreme Court’s 
Zauderer standard for disclosure requirements.45 The Court focused heavily on the requirement 
that disclosure statements not be “unduly burdensome.”46 In positing that Guideline 3 is unduly 
burdensome, the Third Circuit interpreted two cases, Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof. Reg., 
Bd. of Accountancy47 and Public Citizen Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd..48  
 In Ibanez, the “detail required in the disclaimer . . . effectively rule[d] out” the specific 
ways the plaintiff attempted to advertise, which were by “business card, letterhead, and in a 
yellow pages listing.”49 In Public Citizen, the court required attorneys employing televised or 
electronic advertisements to include numerous pieces of information both audibly and in 
                                                        
41 Id. 
42 Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 673 (D.N.J. 2013), rev’d, 762 F.3d (3d Cir. 2014). 
43 Id. at 675. 
44 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 275. 
45 Id. at 287. 
46 Id. 
47 Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994). 
48 Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y. Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011). 
49 Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146-48. 
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writing.50 The Fifth Circuit held that this requirement made the attorneys “unable to effectively 
use short . . . television or radio advertisements.”51  
 Relying on those cases, the Third Circuit held that Guideline 3 “effectively precludes 
advertising” by requiring the full text of opinions instead of excerpts.52  The Court did not 
analyze Guideline 3 under the Cent. Hudson standard for restrictions because “the Guideline is 
not reasonably related to preventing consumer deception . . . Hence, it is unconstitutional under 
the even less-stringent Zauderer standard of scrutiny.”53 The Zauderer standard requires that 
disclosure requirements be reasonably related to the goal of preventing consumer deception.54 
Part III: Analysis 
 Though the Third Circuit determined that Guideline 3 impermissibly restricted Dwyer’s 
First Amendment rights, the Court inappropriately applied a stricter standard than Supreme 
Court has required and misused prior case law to rule in Dwyer’s favor. Using, among other 
things, the very cases the Third Circuit used to reach its contrary decision, this Note will argue 
that the Court should have taken the claims that Dwyer’s advertisement was inherently 
misleading more seriously, because inherently misleading advertisements do not receive 
constitutional protection.55 Furthermore, the note will argue that, in the alternative, Dwyer’s note 
is potentially misleading and therefore open to disclosure requirements.56 
A. Standard of Review 
                                                        
50 Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 228. 
51 Id. 
52 Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2014). 
53 Id. 
54 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
55 See infra Part III E. 
56 See infra Part III F. 
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  When a Court analyzes any First Amendment claim, the first step is to determine the type 
of speech that may be subjected to potential restrictions or disclosure.57 This is because certain 
speech receives “less extensive” levels of protection than others.58 
 Both parties in Dwyer agreed that the speech at issue was commercial in nature.59 
Commercial speech is speech that serves the financial interest of the speaker and “assists 
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of 
information.”60 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized a “commonsense distinction” 
between speech that relates to commercial transactions and other varieties of speech.61  The 
parties’ agreement, that the speech at issue was commercial, helps focus the legal argument, 
because once the type of speech is ascertained, the only remaining issue was what permissible 
restrictions or prohibitions could be placed on that speech.62 While the committee “maintain[ed] 
that Guideline 3 [was] a disclosure requirement,” Dwyer contended that it was an impermissible 
restriction.63  
B. Restrictions and Central Hudson 
 In 1980, the Supreme Court articulated the more repressive of the two types of 
constraints, which completely restricts commercial speech.64 In Central Hudson, the Supreme 
Court tackled a regulation that restricted the advertising ability of a gas and electric company.65 
In 1973, the Public Service Commission of New York banned all electric utilities from 
                                                        
57 Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 309 (1st Cir. 2005) (“the initial question we must confront is 
the nature of the speech”). 
58 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 562-63 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression”). 
59 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 280 (“The parties agree that our case involves only commercial speech”). 
60 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62. 
61 Id. at 562. 
62 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 280 (“[T]his case concerns two possible tracks of analysis, only one of which can apply: 
restrictions on speech and disclosure requirements”). 
63 Id. 
64 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557. 
65 Id. 
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producing any advertising that promoted the use of electricity, while permitting “informational” 
advertising that encouraged “shifts in consumption” as opposed to increases in consumption.66 
The Commission argued that such advertising would be misleading, “by appearing to encourage 
energy consumption at a time when conservationa [was] needed.” 67  Central Hudson sued, 
claiming the ban was a violation of its First Amendment right to free speech.68 The New York 
Court of Appeals upheld the ban, positing, “the governmental interest in the prohibition 
outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue.”69  
 The Supreme Court reversed, and established the test still used today for determining 
whether a restriction on commercial speech is constitutional.70 To analyze the constitutionality of 
a restriction on commercial speech, a court must first ask whether the speech itself is protected.71 
If the speech advertises illegal activity, or if it is misleading, the government may have the 
ability to ban it outright.72 If the advertisement is not misleading or endorsing illegal activity, the 
court must inquire whether the State has asserted a substantial interest that the restriction aims to 
further, and whether the restriction “directly advances” the State’s interest. 73  Lastly, the 
restriction is not constitutional if the State’s interest “could be served as well by a more limited 
restriction.”74 The New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted this same framework.75  
                                                        
66 Id. at 558-60. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 559. 
69 Id. at 561. 
70 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-66. 
71 Id. at 563. 
72 Id. at 563-64. 
73 Id. at 564. 
74 Id. at 564. 
75 In re Op. 39 of Comm. on Att’y Adver., 197 N.J. 66, 69-71, 79 (2008) (using a four-part Central Hudson test to 
determine that a ban on the use of the phrase “Super Lawyer” in advertising was unconstitutional). 
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 It must be noted that the Supreme Court has clearly established a difference between 
“inherently” misleading advertisements and “potentially” misleading advertisements. 76 
Inherently misleading advertisements are subject to restrictions whereas potentially misleading 
advertisements are not. 77  When an advertisement is potentially misleading, disclosure 
requirements may be enforced to prevent its audience from being misled.78 
C. Disclosure Requirements and Zauderer 
 In an effort to clarify the constraints the State could place on commercial speech, the 
Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1985.79 In Zauderer, the Supreme Court decided “whether a 
State may seek to prevent potential deception of the public by requiring attorneys to disclose in 
their advertisements certain information regarding fee arrangements.”80  
 There, attorney Philip Zauderer ran several successful newspaper advertisements. 81 
Though the “Office of Disciplinary Counsel” believed that all Zauderer’s advertisements 
violated provisions of Ohio’s Disciplinary Rules82, the Supreme Court only considered one of the 
advertisements.83 In it, Zauderer marketed to women who had used a particular I.U.D., noting, 
“[t]he cases are handled on a contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no 
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients.”84 The Office argued that this advertisement 
violated a provision under the Disciplinary Rules that required advertisements for contingent-fee 
rates to disclose “whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs and 
expenses,” and that it would deceive potential customers by suggesting they might not be 
                                                        
76 In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); See infra Parts III E and F for a more detailed discussion on 
“potentially” and “inherently” misleading advertising. 
77 In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 203. 
78 Id. 
79 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985). 
80 Id. at 629. 
81 Id. at 629-31. 
82 Id. at 631-33. 
83 Id. at 636. 
84 Id. at 630-631. 
 12 
required to pay anything at all if their claim was unsuccessful.85 Zauderer’s responded by stating 
that the Disciplinary Rules were unconstitutional as applied to him because they violated his 
First Amendment free speech right.86 
 The Supreme Court held that “warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately 
required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception,” because 
disclosure requirements are less burdensome on the party washing to advertise than restrictions.87 
Furthermore, the Court held that disclosure requirements are constitutional as long as they “are 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”88 and are not 
“unduly burdensome.”89 The Court rejected Zauderer’s First Amendment defense.90 
 In doing so, the Supreme Court created a second way for the State to restrict a party’s 
commercial speech, which commands less scrutiny from the Court than it would under Central 
Hudson. Because disclosure requirements need only be reasonably related to preventing 
deception, the burden of persuasion for a disclosure requirement is substantially lower than when 
the State, wishing to restrict commercial speech, is required to establish that the restriction is 
supported by a “substantial” State interest and is narrowly tailored to achieving that interest.91 
D. Guideline 3 and Commercial Speech 
 Though the Third Circuit believed Guideline 3 overly burdened Dwyer’s right to 
advertise, it erred in reversing the District Court’s holding that Guideline 3 permissibly 
constrained free speech under Zauderer. 92  Below, this Note puts forth two arguments 
                                                        
85 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632-634. 
86 Id. at 634. 
87 Id. at 651. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 655. 
91 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). 
92 Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675-76 (D.N.J. 2013), rev’d, 762 F.3d (3d Cir. 2014). 
 13 
demonstrating why Guideline 3 is a permissible constraint on commercial speech. 93  First, 
Dwyer’s advertising on his website was deemed, in the estimation of the source it cited, to be 
inherently misleading. As such, it is not deserving of First Amendment Protection.94 Secondly, 
even if Dwyer’s advertisement was not inherently misleading, it is potentially misleading and 
therefore the State may enforce disclosure requirements.95 Guideline 3 amounts to a disclosure 
requirement, which is not unduly burdensome, as opposed to an effective ban as the Third 
Circuit claims.96  
E. Dwyer’s Advertising Was Deemed Inherently Misleading 
 The Supreme Court in Central Hudson posited, “there can be no constitutional objection 
to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful 
activity.”97 It reasoned that government’s power is only circumscribed when the commercial 
speech is not misleading.98 Two years later, the Court further developed this framework in In re 
R. M. J.,99 holding that while the State could not impose absolute restrictions on information that 
is only potentially misleading, it was within its constitutional authority to prohibit inherently 
misleading advertising entirely. 100  Though the Supreme Court has never explicitly defined 
“inherently misleading,” it hinted in Friedman v. Rogers101 that an issue arises when “there is a 
                                                        
93 See supra Part III A and B. 
94 In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
95 Id. 
96 Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2014). 
97 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). 
98 Id. at 564. 
99 In re R. M. J., 455 U.S at 191. 
100 Id. at 203. 
101 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1978). 
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significant possibility” the public will be misled.102 The Third Circuit has also used this 
“inherently misleading” framework as recently as a few months before Dwyer.103  
 Therefore, it is disconcerting that the Court did not inquire into whether Dwyer’s 
advertising was misleading at all, but rather proceeded immediately to their belief that Guideline 
3 is “not reasonably related” to the State’s interest.104 This was not the appropriate analysis, as 
explained in Zauderer, where the Supreme Court determined that when “the possibility of 
deception is as it is in this case,” the State bears no other burden to support its disclosure 
requirement.105 
 While the Court admits that the Committee considers Guideline 3 to be “inherently 
misleading,” it also noted that Guideline 3 is “not reasonably related to preventing consumer 
deception.”106 But, it was a mistake for the Court to fail to go beyond a cursory discussion of 
whether Dwyer’s advertisement was inherently misleading.107 The entire analysis would have 
shifted if the Court had first determined that Dwyer’s advertising was, in fact, inherently 
misleading and therefore not entitled to any constitutional protection from restrictions.108 For the 
Court to ignore such a significant portion of commercial speech analysis is surprising and might 
be the reason the erred in its reasoning. 
 Dwyer’s advertising was deemed to be inherently misleading because, as in Zauderer, the 
average reasonable public citizen would not understand the proper context of Judge 
                                                        
102 See also In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. at 202 (where the Court understood it to mean “inherently likely to deceive”). 
103 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 89-90 (3rd Cir. 2014) (where the Third Circuit explained that, since Central 
Hudson, the Supreme Court has distinguished inherently or actually misleading commercial speech from only 
potentially misleading commercial speech) (citing Wine & Spirits Retailers v. R.I., 481 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
104 Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 280-82 (3d Cir. 2014). 
105 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985) (upholding a disclosure 
requirement regarding an advertisement that claimed no legal fees would be required but upon a successful lawsuit 
because it was held to mislead clients into believing that no fees, whatsoever, would be required). 
106 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 282. 
107 Id. 
108 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); See also In re R. 
M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
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Wertheimer’s quote and might make an impermissible inference about its content. That is 
precisely the interpretation made by the advertisement’s source itself. Wertheimer was primarily 
concerned with clients believing his quote was “a blanket endorsement” of Dwyer’s skills as an 
attorney, though this was clearly not the case.109 Like the others on Dwyer’s website, 
Wertheimer’s quote came in the context of determining a fee-shifting application, where the 
judge is required to make a judgment about the attorney’s performance.110 This quote, therefore, 
was an obligatory part of Judge Wertheimer’s decision and not given freely as an 
endorsement.111 
 As Cappell argued, Dwyer’s advertising, however, could lead a potential customer to 
believe Judge Wertheimer was endorsing Dwyer as an attorney. Here, as in Zauderer, the State 
argued that the deceit was “self-evident” and therefore required no external proof of consumer 
deception.112 No part of Dwyer’s website clarified that the quotations were made in a highly 
specific context, which did not pertain to Dwyer’s skills as an attorney in general. 113 
Additionally, Dwyer did not retain any mention of fee-shifting in the quotes, depriving the 
statements of the necessary context to appreciate their appropriate meaning. 114  This is 
comparable to the deception in Zauderer, where an attorney advertised, “[i]f there is no recovery, 
no legal fees are owed by our clients.”115 There, the advertisement was misleading because “to a 
layman . . . the advertisement would suggest that employing appellant would be a no-lose 
proposition,” when in fact a client might still be required to pay other costs associated with 
                                                        
109 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 277. 
110 Id. at 277-78. 
111 Id. 
112 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985). 
113 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 276-77. 
114 Id. at 277. 
115 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631. 
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trials.116 Dwyer’s advertising is just as confusing to a layperson who might believe these judges 
are personally endorsing Dwyer above other attorneys. That type of behavior by a judge would 
most likely violate the New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct. 117  Because laypersons are 
unfamiliar with rules against impropriety, common sense indicates that a client would believe 
such impropriety were taking place and that the judges were speaking about Dwyer’s talents in 
general.  
 Therefore, because Judge Wertheimer could have reasonably believed Dwyer’s 
advertisements were inherently misleading, and inherently misleading advertisements are not 
deserving of First Amendment protection, the Court erred in disregarding the analysis. If 
Dwyer’s advertising is inherently misleading, Guideline 3 is permissible.118 
F. Dwyer’s Advertising Was Potentially Misleading And Therefore Constitutionally 
Subject To A Disclosure Requirement 
 If Dwyer’s advertisements were not inherently misleading, they were at least potentially 
misleading for the same reasons.119 The Supreme Courts of both New Jersey and the United 
States have explicitly stated that attorney advertising can still be subject to certain restrictions or 
requirements, even when blanket bans are inappropriate.120 In Zauderer, the Supreme Court of 
the United States held that disclosure requirements must be reasonably related to the 
governmental interest and must not be overly burdensome.121 In essence, a requirement is unduly 
                                                        
116 Id. at 652, 634-35. 
117 N.J. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1, 2(A) (2014) (stating that a judge should “personally observe” “high 
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved” and act in ways that 
promote “public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”). 
118 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). 
119 See supra Part III E. 
120 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“In holding that advertising by attorneys may not be 
subjected to blanket suppression... we, of course, do not hold that advertising by attorneys may not be regulated in 
any way.”); See also In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 104 N.J. 515, 517 (1986).  
121 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
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burdensome when it is a practical ban on speech, rather than an actual ban.122 Here, Guideline 3 
furthers the dual legitimate governmental interests of preventing deception of potential clients 
and also “preserving public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.”123 Additionally, it is 
not overly burdensome as applied to Dwyer because the nature of websites generally permit a 
“theoretically endless capacity” to advertise.124 
 A look at how the First Circuit has approached Zauderer proves to be informative in 
determining appropriate disclosure requirements. In Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, the First 
Circuit dealt with a Vermont statute that required products containing mercury to have their 
packaging “inform consumers that the products contain mercury” and proper recycling 
procedure.125 The Court upheld the statute, reversing the District Court’s determination that the 
statute was “insufficiently precise in producing the desired ends.”126 Responding to this specific 
objection to the statute, the First Circuit said, “[t]he prescribed labeling would likely contribute 
directly to the reduction of mercury pollution, whether or not it makes the greatest possible 
contribution.”127 The First Circuit understood that the test established under Zauderer was meant 
to require a  “less exacting scrutiny” than the Central Hudson test. 128  It is not, therefore, 
necessary for a disclosure requirement to satisfy the requirement from Central Hudson that there 
be no less restrictive way to serve the government’s interest.129 
 In the New Jersey statute, like the statute in Nat’l Elec., there are other requirements 
besides Guideline 3 that may potentially better serve the state’s interests in preventing consumer 
                                                        
122 Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2014). 
123 Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (D.N.J. 2013), rev’d, 762 F.3d (3d Cir. 2014); See also Brief for 
Appellee at 19-20, Dwyer v. Cappell, No. 13-3235, 762 F.3d. 
124 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 284. 
125 Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
126 Id. at 115. 
127 Id. (emphasis added). 
128 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010). 
129 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
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deception and preserving the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. In fact, the 
Third Circuit gives insightful suggestions for less burdensome requirements on attorney 
advertising that would still serve the State’s interests.130 Though those requirements may more 
effectively further the State’s interests, the Zauderer test does not require such narrow tailoring 
of disclosure requirements; all it requires is that the State’s interest is “reasonably related” to the 
disclosure requirement.131 Here, Guideline 3’s requirement to post the entire holding reasonably 
allows consumers to determine that these judicial quotes were made in the context of a much 
larger litigation. This will dispel the idea that these quotes were the focal point of the hearing, or 
that they were unprovoked compliments. In fact, it would be difficult for the Third Circuit to 
support its conclusion that context, in any situation, does not reasonably give better clarity to an 
excerpt. This is, in fact, the exact argument the District Court put forth when it ruled in favor of 
Cappell in upholding the constitutionality of Guideline 3. Specifically, the court said, “A judicial 
quotation’s potential to mislead a consumer is self-evidence. Without the surrounding context of 
a full opinion, judicial quotations relating to an attorney’s abilities could easily be misconstrued 
as improper judicial endorsement of an attorney.”132 Therefore the Third Circuit wrongly applied 
the Central Hudson standard of scrutiny when determining whether Guideline 3 was reasonably 
related to the State’s interest. 
 Furthermore, the Third Circuit incorrectly held that Guideline 3 is “unduly 
burdensome.” 133  To substantiate its claim, the Court focused on two other cases wherein 
disclosure requirements were held to be unduly burdensome, Ibanez and Public Citizen Inc. v. 
                                                        
130 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 283 (suggesting there be a disclaimer that states, “This is an excerpt of a judicial opinion 
from a specific legal dispute. It is not an endorsement of my abilities”). 
131 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
132 Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp 2d. 670, 674-75 (D.N.J. 2013). 
133 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 284. 
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La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.. 134  Those cases, however, bear little resemblance to Dwyer’s 
situation. 135  Whereas the disclosure requirements in those cases effectively banned the 
commercial speech altogether, Guideline 3, at least when applied to websites, does not go that 
far. Because of a website’s vast storage capacity, Dwyer is not inhibited from advertising online 
like the attorneys in Ibanez and Public Citizen. The Third Circuit recognized this when it said, 
“[t]he only realistic medium for quoting a full judicial opinion in an advertisement is, ironically, 
a website, with its theoretically endless capacity.” 136  Websites are a “realistic medium” for 
Guideline 3, because their vast storage allow for virtually unlimited amounts of content. Though 
the Third Circuit found this fact “ironic,” it ought to have considered it more closely; an 
understanding that Guideline 3 is not unduly burdensome as applied to websites would have 
altered the outcome of the case. 
 Although the Court attempted to look beyond Dwyer’s particular case and claimed that 
“Guideline 3 is all the more stark when applied to attorney advertising in a newspaper or 
magazine, let alone on the radio or television,”137 the Court erred in striking down Guideline as it 
is applied to Dwyer. Guideline 3 is not unduly burdensome as applied to advertising on a 
website. Other situations where Guideline 3 applies were not before the court to consider, and 
therefore the Court should not have let them affect their holding.138 
Part IV: The Effect 
 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court emphasized the great importance and unwavering 
power of the First Amendment, stating “[i]f the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it 
                                                        
134 Id. at 283-84. 
135 Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1994); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y. 
Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 
136 Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 284. 
137 Id. at 285 n.7. 
138 See Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) (where the Court, when faced with the magnitude of effects their holding 
could have on criminal procedure across the country, stated, “...we can only judge the facts of the case before us”). 
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means that, absent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression 
because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public.”139 This authoritative statement 
represents a pillar of American freedom, and this Note does not undermine it. Therefore, the 
reader must recognize that where this Note contemplates the effects of the Third Circuit’s 
holding, it does not do so to present any of them as justifications for overturning the Third 
Circuit. These are separate and distinct issues. Ultimately, the ruling in Dwyer should be 
overturned because the Third Circuit misused the lenient Zauderer standard to invalidate 
Guideline 3.  
 The Third Circuit’s ruling will likely have several prominent consequences. Though there 
may be other results from the holding, this Note will only focus on the two most likely outcomes. 
First, the Third Circuit’s holding will make it harder, moving forward, to meaningfully restrict 
attorney’s speech to benefit the public. Additionally, and arguably more importantly, the Court’s 
holding will negatively impact public trust in the legal community at large, and in the 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
 First, the Third Circuit’s holding took a large step away from the accepted practice of 
assuring attorney’s free conduct and speech do not impede their vital role as counselors, 
advocates, and professionals in the legal field.140 It was not, and is not, uncommon for rules 
governing attorney’s behavior and responsibilities to infringe upon attorney’s rights in several 
ways. In fact, all fifty states have laws governing attorney conduct as it applies to advertising.141  
The “Canons of Professional Ethics” generally restricted an attorney’s right to publicize 
                                                        
139 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 575 (1980) (emphasis added). 
140 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (“The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special 
responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in 
the public interest...”). 
141 See generally, ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2; CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-28A; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-
38. 
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regarding pending litigation; and even when it was permitted, attorneys were forbidden from 
speaking anonymously about it.142 Even some of the most modern rules substantially limit an 
attorney’s ability to make any “extrajudicial statement” that has the potential to prejudice an 
adjudicative proceeding.143 Furthermore, attorneys are still restricted in the manners in which 
they can advertise. For example, New Jersey attorneys are currently unable to utilize “drawings, 
animations, dramatizations, music, or lyrics” in commercials.144 Also, though the New Jersey 
Supreme Court upheld a “Best Lawyer” rating system, there are twelve “regulatory components” 
that any advertisement using such a label needs to satisfy.145 
 Some restrictions have been overridden or rewritten over time but the same ideal, that it 
is appropriate and necessary to restrict attorney’s speech and conduct, has been the guiding 
motivation throughout. This stems from the understanding that attorneys undertake an important 
professional imperative that deals with the most crucial “system” in the nation, the legal system. 
Without appropriate restraint, however, the legal profession will cease to be directed primarily at 
aiding the client and will become a solely commercial enterprise where competing attorneys 
spend more time on marketing than advocating on behalf of their client. Without restraint, 
attorneys could forsake the good of their clients, and the public at large, for financial gain. 
Without restraint, attorneys could use their superior knowledge of the legal system to mislead 
clients into pursuing options, or spending money, that might not be wise.   
 For example, if New Jersey attorneys were not restricted from using music or 
dramatizations in their television advertisements, their commercials could be so distracting, with 
cartoons and loud music, that the potential clients would have no idea about what services the 
                                                        
142 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 20 (1908). 
143 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2004). 
144 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a) (2004). 
145 In re Opinion 39 of Committee on Attorney Advertising, 197 N.J. 66, 76-77 (2008). 
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attorney actually offers. Additionally, a commercial in which an attorney is dressed as superman 
might mislead a viewer into believing that the attorney is claiming to be the best attorney in the 
relevant area. While this specific restriction might make an attorney’s commercials dull in 
comparison to other commercials, it is a helpful tool in preventing viewers from being confused 
and mislead. Lastly, an attorney allowed to utilize the term “Best Lawyer”, without also being 
required to provide information regarding the twelve regulatory components that fully explain 
the “Best Lawyer” selection process, could certainly cause a potential client to believe that some 
third party agency truly labeled that attorney as the best one in New Jersey. These examples 
demonstrate the necessity for restriction in attorney advertising for the benefit of the public at 
large. 
 This does not imply that all restrictions are constitutional, however. For example, the 
“Canons of Professional Ethics” banned the use of business cards without personal relations 
because it offended “the traditions and lower[ed] the tone of our profession,” but Bates v. State 
Bar of Ariz.146 invalidated that indiscriminate ban on attorney speech.147  What it does imply is 
that a substantial government interest exists in restricting the speech and conduct of attorneys. 
There is a sense, then, that when men and women take up the noble task of establishing a career 
in the law, they must accept that certain freedoms must be forfeited when balancing against other 
societal interests. 
 By ruling in favor of an attorney who believed his rights were impeded because he could 
not quote specific judges in the exact way he desired, the Third Circuit has created dangerous 
precedent where the valuable restraints on attorney conduct may begin to slowly erode and give 
                                                        
146 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). 
147 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (1908) (Allowed for use of business cards but stated that advertising, 
directly, without personal relations, or indirectly, offends “the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are 
reprehensible”). 
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way to unrestrained attorneys. These restraints hold a special importance not as applied to all 
professions in which the public trusts, but specifically in the legal profession. The Supreme 
Court in Bates stated that the legal profession is held to a higher standard of conduct than most 
other professions, and that “misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in 
other advertising may found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.”148 Although the Court 
placed some onus on the legal profession to attempt to remove any misunderstandings the public 
may have about attorney advertising, it eventually ruled that self-evidently misleading 
advertising can be restricted without appealing to the public or attempting to clarify the 
advertisement.149 And even though the Supreme Court, again in Bates, wrote, “[w]e are not 
persuaded that restrained professional advertising by lawyers inevitably will be misleading,” the 
Third Circuit’s ruling in Dwyer may lead to unbridled advertising. 150 
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, through Cappell, stated that it had a compelling 
interest in enforcing Guideline 3 because it aimed to “preserv[e] public confidence in the 
impartiality of the judiciary.”151  Ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Guideline 3, the 
District Court recognized this purpose of the guideline when it stated that advertisements that 
“could be easily misconstrued as improper judicial endorsements” would threaten “the integrity 
of the judicial system.”152 This confidence extends to the entire legal community, however, and 
the Third Circuit’s ruling threatens to undermine that confidence. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has recognized the importance of regulating attorney conduct, stating in In Re Hearing on 
Immunity for Ethics Complainants, “[w]e ask the public to trust and believe that justice is being 
                                                        
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 375 (stating “If the naiveté of the public will cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the 
bar’s role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising in its proper 
perspective”); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 (1985). 
150 Bates, 433 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). 
151 Brief for Appellee at 19-20, Dwyer v. Cappell, No. 13-3235, 762 F.3d. 
152 Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d. 670, 675 (D.N.J. 2013). 
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done . . . We ask them to trust a system in which the initial proceedings and the initial appellate 
review are dominated by lawyers.”153 There, the New Jersey Supreme Court demonstrated an 
understanding that overseeing and restricting attorney conduct is a vital aspect of public trust in 
the legal system.154 Because of the Third Circuit’s holding in Dwyer, attorneys are now capable 
of using quotes that can easily be understood by reasonable, but uninformed, persons to be 
blanket endorsements and the public might begin to believe that attorneys can compete for the 
favor of judges.155 This is troubling because of the mandate that judges act in ways that “public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”156  A judge is unable to show 
favoritism to any particular attorney. But, this holding threatens the same public confidence that 
judicial restrictions aim to protect. 
 This presents a significant problem because of the potential for damaging results when a 
community loses trust in the propriety of the legal system. Most Americas are familiar with 
examples demonstrating that the public seeks justice in ways that are less than appropriate when 
it does not feel as though it can trust the legal profession.157 This is the reason New Jersey sought 
to restrict attorney’s free speech; public confidence in attorney conduct is of supreme value. If 
individuals begin to lose their trust in the ability of attorneys to faithfully and selflessly represent 
them, as opposed to using them as their next paycheck, then all the attorney free speech in the 
world will not undo the damage done.  
 Though free speech is a beautiful right and one of the most fundamental rights upon 
which our nation is built, it must be balanced, in the commercial context, against other important 
national interests. Because Dwyer broadens the limits of attorney conduct and advertising even 
                                                        
153 In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 678-79 (1984). 
154 Id. (upholding process that regulated attorney ethical conduct). 
155 See supra Part III E. 
156 N.J. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1, 2(A). 
157 See http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/us/los-angeles-riots-fast-facts/. 
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farther for future cases, and may cause the public to lose trust in the impartiality of the legal 
system as a whole, the Third Circuit’s ruling threatens to upset this balance. 
Part V: Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey correctly indicated that “attorney advertising without 
any restrictions whatsoever might seriously damage important public interests, but that excessive 
restriction might harm other public interests equally important.”158 This balance ought to be at 
the forefront of any free speech analysis regarding attorney conduct and advertising. This Note 
has not endorsed excessive restriction on attorney advertising; rather, that, in ruling that 
Guideline 3 was unconstitutional as applied to Andrew Dwyer, the Third Circuit was mistaken 
on both the law and public policy interests that fuel codes of professional conduct across the fifty 
states and, more importantly, in New Jersey. Because Dwyer’s advertising was deemed to be 
inherently misleading by the source of the quote, Judge Wertheimer, it did not deserve to receive 
any constitutional protection. In that case, Guideline 3 is constitutional and appropriate.159 
 Alternatively, even if Dwyer’s advertising was not inherently misleading, Guideline 3 
satisfies the two prongs for disclosure requirements established in Zauderer.160  Guideline 3 
meets the first prong that the requirement be reasonably related to the State’s interests, which in 
this case are to prevent deception of potential clients and also preserve public confidence in the 
impartiality of the judiciary. Providing the full contexts of judicial quotes at least reasonably 
serves those interests, even if, admittedly, the goals are potentially better served by other 
measures. This is satisfactory because Circuit Courts have understood that Zauderer does not 
require a narrow tailoring of the disclosure requirement to the goal, only, again, that they be 
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“reasonably” related.161 Guideline 3 satisfies the second prong because it does not unduly burden 
Dwyer. It argued that, in attempting to use the Internet as his medium of choice to advertise, 
Dwyer is still capable of posting his desired text along with the required disclosures Guideline 3 
mandates and, because of this, he is not effectively banned from advertising. 
 Furthermore, this Note examined the public policy concerns with the Third Circuit’s 
holding and suggested that this ruling will have an impact on attorney advertising and then, 
consequently, a significant impact on the public’s view of the legal system in general. This ruling 
could open the door for future unrest as people lose faith that attorneys are obligated to act in the 
best interests of their clients, instead behaving more like a commercial entity whose main 
objective is the bottom dollar. Additionally, the Third Circuit’s ruling has a much more direct 
effect on the public view of judicial biases, as Judge Wertheimer’s quotes may reappear on 
Dwyer’s website at any time and a reasonable person could easily conclude that the quote 
constitutes a blanket endorsement of Dwyer, giving the appearance of favoritism and 
impropriety.162 
 Ultimately, one can only guess at the future implications of this decision, particularly if 
other circuit courts rule in like manner. This Note does not endeavor to postulate all potential 
roads this ruling might lead us down, nor could it do so. One thing can be known for certain—
though Andrew Dwyer won before the Third Circuit in the summer of 2014, his was not a 
victory for the legal profession or for the public at large. 
                                                        
161 Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
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